Team
New Orleans Saints
NFC South
This is the cleanest before-and-after in the league: one of the most consistently excellent offenses of the 2000s and 2010s became one of its worst the moment the quarterback play stopped. The carousel of Winston, Dalton, Carr and rookies never replaced what left, and an aging, cap-strapped roster gave the rebuild nothing to lean on. The Saints' entire identity flipped from offense-first to a defense trying to survive.
The bottom of the South
For 15 years the Saints owned a top-9 offense. Then it fell off the map: 27th in 2025.
TrendNew Orleans offense EPA rank, before and after Brees
| Span | Avg offense rank | Best | Worst |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brees era 2006-2020 | 5th | 2nd | 9th |
| Post-Brees 2021-2025 | 22nd | 13th | 27th |
Worst offenses of 2025, EPA/play (regular season)
| Rank | Team | Off EPA/play |
|---|---|---|
| 25 | LAC | -0.024 |
| 26 | CAR | -0.039 |
| 27 | NO | -0.088 |
| 28 | MIN | -0.116 |
| 32 | LV | -0.215 |
Across Brees's 15 seasons in the dome (2006-2020) the Saints' offense averaged a 5th-place EPA ranking and never finished worse than 9th. Since he retired they have averaged 22nd, and the bottom keeps falling out: 24th in 2021, then 25th in 2024, then 27th in 2025 at -0.088 EPA per play, their worst offensive ranking since 2005. In fifteen Brees seasons they were never worse than 9th; in five seasons since, they have never been better than 13th.
Why it matters. This is the cleanest before-and-after in the league: one of the most consistently excellent offenses of the 2000s and 2010s became one of its worst the moment the quarterback play stopped. The carousel of Winston, Dalton, Carr and rookies never replaced what left, and an aging, cap-strapped roster gave the rebuild nothing to lean on. The Saints' entire identity flipped from offense-first to a defense trying to survive.
When Derek Carr went down in 2024, the Saints' backups posted the 2nd-worst QB season the NFL has seen since 2018.
RareNew Orleans passing by QB, 2024 (regular season)
| Passer | Dropbacks | EPA/dropback | CPOE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Derek Carr | 290 | +0.146 | +3.3 |
| Spencer Rattler | 250 | -0.339 | -9.1 |
| Jake Haener | 45 | -0.332 | -17.3 |
Worst qualified QB seasons, 2018-2025 (min 250 dropbacks, reg season)
| Rank | Passer | Season | EPA/dropback |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Josh Rosen | 2018 | -0.352 |
| 2 | Spencer Rattler | 2024 | -0.339 |
| 3 | Bryce Young | 2023 | -0.280 |
| 4 | Zach Wilson | 2023 | -0.258 |
| 5 | Deshaun Watson | 2024 | -0.246 |
Two quarterbacks, two different teams. With Carr upright the Saints threw at +0.146 EPA per dropback (+3.3 CPOE), a comfortably top-10 rate. The moment he got hurt, the offense fell through the floor: rookie Spencer Rattler's -0.339 EPA on 250 dropbacks was the 2nd-worst qualified QB season in the NFL across eight years, beaten only by Josh Rosen's 2018. His -9.1 CPOE means he completed passes 9 points below expectation given the throws he attempted, and Jake Haener's 45 dropbacks were just as bleak.
Why it matters. This is the cost of an aging, expensive roster with no plan behind center. The Saints had paid up for Carr and built nothing underneath him, so a single injury turned a functional offense into one of the most inefficient passing attacks of the analytics era. The 2024 season was decided less by scheme than by who was holding the ball.
The Saints reached 20 points six times all season, tied for fewest in football. They went 5-1 when they got there.
SplitNO 2025 by the 20-point line (regular season)
| Scoring | Games | Record |
|---|---|---|
| 20+ points | 6 | 5-1 |
| Under 20 | 11 | 1-10 |
Fewest games of 20+ points, 2025
| Team | Games at 20+ |
|---|---|
| CLE | 6 |
| LV | 6 |
| NO | 6 |
| CAR | 7 |
| NYJ | 8 |
| TEN | 8 |
Twenty points is the fastest honest read of whether an offense showed up: across 2025 the league won 67.3% of the time when it got there, and across the last quarter century that number is 69.7%. New Orleans got there six times in seventeen games, tied with Cleveland and Las Vegas for the fewest in football, and the split explains the whole season: 5-1 when the offense reached 20, 1-10 when it didn't. The defense held up its end. It was almost never given a workable score.
Why it matters. The 20-point pulse check separates two failure modes: teams that lose shootouts and teams that never get a shootout started. The Saints are purely the second kind. An offense that clears the line six times in a season makes every defensive effort a tightrope walk, and the 5-1 record on the good days says the rest of this roster wins ordinary games when the offense is merely adequate. The fix is singular and obvious.
The Saints' fingerprints
The Taysom Hill package was never about surprise. The sneaky early-down keeps lost money; the ones everyone saw coming printed it.
NO designed QB runs, 2017-2025 (regular season)
| Team | Designed QB runs | NFL rank |
|---|---|---|
| BAL | 794 | 1st |
| PHI | 587 | 2nd |
| NO | 548 | 3rd |
| BUF | 465 | 4th |
| ARI | 396 | 5th |
Where the keeps paid, NO 2017-2025
| Situation | Keeps | EPA/play | On-schedule / converted |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 or less to go (any down) | 183 | +0.461 | 72.1% converted |
| Early down, 3+ to go | 334 | -0.040 | 45.5% success |
| 3rd/4th down, 3+ to go | 31 | +0.088 | 38.7% converted |
Only the Lamar Jackson Ravens and the Hurts Eagles have called more designed quarterback runs than New Orleans since 2017, and 449 of the Saints' 548 belong to Taysom Hill (+0.132 EPA per carry). The folklore says the package works because nobody expects it. The ledger says the opposite: the 334 early-down keeps, the surprise spots, lost value (-0.040 EPA), while the 183 keeps needing two yards or less, the most telegraphed run in football, produced +0.461 EPA and converted 72.1% of the time. The gimmick was never the trick play. It was the extra blocker.
Why it matters. MYTH TEST: a designed keep pays because the quarterback carrying the ball adds a blocker to the math, and that edge is worth the most exactly where the defense is most cramped: short yardage and the goal line. Surprise adds nothing, because a called run has to beat a defense allowed to play the run anyway. That is why Hill kept converting for a decade after every defensive coordinator in the league knew precisely what was coming.
The Saints chuck it deep more than almost anyone, can't connect, and yet smother the deep ball on defense.
AnomalyDeep ball (20+ air yards), New Orleans 2023-2025, offense vs defense rank
| Side | NFL rank | Comp % | EPA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Throw deep (frequency) | 4th most | 12.5% of dropbacks | - |
| Deep-ball offense (EPA) | 27th | 29.6% | +0.183 |
| Deep-ball defense (EPA allowed) | 5th best | 33.0% allowed | +0.193 |
Best deep-ball defense, EPA allowed on 20+ air yards, 2023-2025
| Rank | Team | Comp % allowed | Deep att faced |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | PHI | 29.9% | 224 |
| 2 | GB | 36.2% | 152 |
| 3 | NE | 30.7% | 205 |
| 4 | SEA | 36.3% | 182 |
| 5 | NO | 33.0% | 218 |
New Orleans throws deep on 12.5% of dropbacks, the 4th-highest rate in the league, and gets almost nothing for it: 27th in deep-ball EPA, a 29.6% completion rate on those 20-plus-yard heaves. Flip to the other side of the ball and the same team is 5th-best in the NFL at defending the deep shot (+0.193 EPA allowed), holding opposing bombs to a 33.0% completion rate. They keep launching balls they can't catch while erasing the ones thrown at them.
Why it matters. It is a roster mismatch in plain sight: a thin, unreliable receiving and quarterback group that keeps forcing the ball vertically, paired with a secondary good enough to take the top off any opponent. The fix is obvious from the split, stop forcing the deep ball you can't win and lean on the deep coverage you already own. Instead they do the opposite.
The league gives its lead back half the carries and its top receiver a quarter of the targets. New Orleans runs the formula backwards.
AnomalyLeague shape, 2025 (regular season averages)
| Role | Avg share of team volume |
|---|---|
| Top rusher (carries) | 54.6% |
| Top receiver (targets) | 23.3% |
New Orleans shape, 2025
| Player | Volume | Share | NFL rank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alvin Kamara | 131 carries | 33.3% | 2nd-lowest lead-back share |
| Devin Neal | 57 carries | 14.5% | - |
| Taysom Hill | 52 carries | 13.2% | - |
| Chris Olave | 156 targets | 27.6% | 8th-highest top-target share |
Across the NFL in 2025, the average team gave its lead rusher 54.6% of its carries and its top receiver 23.3% of its targets: one lead runner, a cast of receivers. New Orleans inverted it. Alvin Kamara's 33.3% carry share was the 2nd-lowest for any team's lead back, with Devin Neal and Taysom Hill eating the rest, while Chris Olave's 27.6% target share ranked 8th-highest in the league. A committee ground game feeding a one-man passing tree.
Why it matters. Usage shape tells you what a staff trusts. Spreading carries three ways says nobody behind this line earned a bell-cow role, or Kamara at this age can no longer hold one; funneling targets to Olave says he is the only receiver defenses respect. Both halves of the inversion point at the same roster gap: the skill positions need a second reliable pass-catcher more than another runner, because the concentration is already maxed out on the one they have.
The fortress and the wall
The Superdome was a fortress under Brees. Now home field is worth almost exactly nothing.
AnomalyNew Orleans home vs away, by era (regular season)
| Era | Home record | Home margin | Away record | Away margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brees 2013-2020 | 44-20 (.688) | +5.6 | 37-27 (.578) | +3.3 |
| Post-Brees 2021-2025 | 18-24 (.429) | +0.5 | 18-25 (.419) | -1.7 |
Best home scoring margin, 2013-2020 (reg season)
| Rank | Team | Home margin | Home record |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | NE | +10.6 | 53-11 |
| 2 | KC | +7.6 | 47-17 |
| 3 | SEA | +7.2 | 47-17 |
| 5 | PIT | +7.0 | 46-18 |
| 7 | NO | +5.6 | 44-20 |
From 2013-2020 the Saints won 68.8% of their home games and outscored visitors by +5.6 per game in the dome, a top-7 home margin in the NFL. Since 2021 the famous indoor advantage has all but disappeared: .429 at home, a near-identical .419 on the road, and a home margin of +0.5 that is statistically a coin flip. Same building, same noise, same conditions (40 of 42 home games since 2021 played under a dome roof, the other two relocated). The edge left with the quarterback.
Why it matters. Home-field advantage in a dome is supposed to be structural: controlled conditions, a deafening crowd, no weather. The Saints kept the building and lost the benefit, which means the old advantage was never really the Superdome, it was Drew Brees operating a clean offense in it. Strip out the franchise quarterback and the fortress is just a roof.
Their run defense was 30th in 2024, then jumped to 2nd in 2025. The whole-defense swing is the wildest in football.
TrendNew Orleans defense by season (regular season)
| Season | Overall def rank | Run EPA allowed | Run def rank |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 2nd | -0.131 | 1st |
| 2022 | 6th | -0.023 | 17th |
| 2023 | 5th | -0.067 | 12th |
| 2024 | 24th | +0.109 | 30th |
| 2025 | 10th | -0.073 | 2nd |
Run defense extremes around New Orleans (EPA allowed per rush)
| Season | Rank | Team | EPA allowed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 30th | NO | +0.109 |
| 2024 | 31st | DAL | +0.147 |
| 2024 | 32nd | CAR | +0.160 |
| 2025 | 1st | SEA | -0.145 |
| 2025 | 2nd | NO | -0.073 |
| 2025 | 3rd | TB | -0.072 |
The Saints fielded a top-6 defense for four straight years (2020-2023), peaking at 2nd in the NFL in 2021 with the league's best run defense. Then 2024 caved in, 24th overall, and 30th against the run (+0.109 EPA allowed), keeping company with the historically bad Dallas and Carolina fronts. One offseason later it snapped back: 10th overall and the 2nd-best run defense in football at -0.073, trailing only Seattle. A 28-spot leap in run-defense rank in a single year is about as violent a swing as the metric produces.
Why it matters. While the offense was crumbling, the defense was the one unit holding identity, and even it cracked in 2024 before being rebuilt fast. Run defense is also the half that history says carries over best from year to year, which makes the 2025 wall the most bankable piece on this roster heading into 2026, even after watching it crater once. This is the part of the team worth keeping.
Saints defense is 3rd-best in the 4th quarter, and 21st when the 4th quarter actually matters.
SplitNew Orleans defense, 4th-quarter EPA allowed, 2023-2025
| Rank | Team | Q4 EPA allowed |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | DEN | -0.174 |
| 2 | CLE | -0.156 |
| 3 | NO | -0.149 |
| 4 | HOU | -0.141 |
| 5 | KC | -0.084 |
Same defense, competitive late situations only (win prob 20-80%), 2023-2025
| Rank | Team | Clutch EPA allowed |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | MIN | -0.201 |
| 2 | HOU | -0.176 |
| 3 | PIT | -0.148 |
| 21 | NO | +0.047 |
Look at raw 4th-quarter numbers and the Saints defense is elite: 3rd in the NFL at -0.149 EPA allowed. Narrow it to plays that decide games, the 4th quarter or final five minutes with win probability between 20-80%, and the same unit drops to 21st at +0.047 EPA allowed. The gap is the tell: a lot of that gaudy 4th-quarter number is piled up in blowouts that were already settled, with opponents trailing and the Saints sitting on a lead or trying to keep a loss respectable.
Why it matters. A defense's 4th-quarter ranking is one of the most misleading stats in football because garbage-time snaps flood it. When you strip the score back to a true coin-flip game, this Saints defense is a middle-of-the-pack unit, not the closer its quarter-by-quarter line implies. For a team that lost 11 games in 2025, the moments it could not get a stop were the competitive ones.
Five straight years out of the playoffs. In the last quarter century, the Saints have never waited longer.
MilestoneLongest active playoff droughts, through 2025
| Team | Last playoff season | Seasons since |
|---|---|---|
| NYJ | 2010 | 15 |
| ATL | 2017 | 8 |
| IND | 2020 | 5 |
| NO | 2020 | 5 |
| ARI | 2021 | 4 |
| LV | 2021 | 4 |
| TEN | 2021 | 4 |
New Orleans playoff gaps since 1999
| Gap | Length |
|---|---|
| 2001-2005 | 5 seasons |
| 2007-2008 | 2 seasons |
| 2012 | 1 season |
| 2014-2016 | 3 seasons |
| 2021-2025 | 5 seasons (active) |
New Orleans has not played a postseason snap since the 2020 team lost with Brees in his final game. The current five-season drought ties 2001-2005 as the franchise's longest of the last quarter century, and only the Jets and Falcons currently carry a longer wait. For a fan base that watched playoff football every year from 2017 through 2020, five silent Januaries is a different kind of era.
Why it matters. Droughts frame everything a front office does: cap decisions, coach patience, and how much pain a fan base will absorb for a rebuild. The Saints spent years pushing cap charges into the future to keep a closing window open, and this drought is the bill. The encouraging read is that the franchise has been exactly here once before, 2001-2005, and the year that ended it delivered Brees, Payton, and the best 15-year run in team history.
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